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ABSTRACT 
 
This study sets out to identify the most effective way in which persistently and unacceptably 
high levels of inequality can be reduced in South Africa. Three alternative approaches were 
identified from the literature and their impact explored statistically.  They are: the 
introduction of a ‘Social Solidarity Grant’; a decrease in unemployment by 5%; and a 
narrowing of the skill premium through an expansion of tertiary education.  
It is important to note that the study makes no attempt at explaining how these outcomes 
might be implemented or achieved.  Rather, it sets out to determine only the effect that such 
policies may have on measured inequality.  
It was found that while the introduction of a new grant had a significant effect on 
inequality, this effect however, was once-off. The grant would be financed by individuals in 
the top decile through tax increases, which would be a complicated endeavour. Both job 
creation and a narrowing of the skills premium were significantly effective in decreasing 
inequality.  The narrowing of the skills premium showed more promise due to its accelerating 
effectiveness in decreasing inequality over time and the fact that it directly addresses the 
problem of wage differentials.  
It was noted that the extreme levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa may 
dampen enthusiasm for policies that narrow the skills premium to reduce inequality. These 
characteristics make job creation a more popular policy option because of the positive impact 
on poverty and unemployment as well as on inequality.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Context of the research 
Inequality is considered to be a pervasive problem, especially in developing countries, and 
has consequently been a priority on the policy agendas of many governments the world over 
for quite some time. Inequality is a problem that involves a wide dispersion in either the 
wealth held or income earned between the rich and the poor - some people have much more 
than others.  In an equal society people would all have more or less the same endowments in 
terms of income and wealth. According to the most recent data available, South Africa 
experiences one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world (World Bank, 2014).  
The notion of inequality is accompanied by many questions. What causes inequality? Why 
does it persist? Is inequality necessarily bad? Why and how is it bad, if it is bad? If we can 
conclusively say that it is not a good thing how do we go about rectifying it? What policies 
have been used to address inequality in South Africa and other countries? Have these policies 
been effective?  
These questions will be addressed in the review of the literature regarding inequality. Few 
authors deny that inequality is not a good thing.  It not only impairs social development but 
also perpetuates poverty and diminishes the positive effects of economic growth. 
According to authors such as Kuznets (1955), Kanbur (2011), Leibrandt et al (1999), 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001) and Ravallion (2001) inequality and its reduction are subjects 
deserving much attention. While the authors may not agree regarding what causes inequality 
or how it can best be reduced, they find common ground in the assertion that high rates of 
pervasive and persistent inequality are harmful.  
Kuznets (1955: 2) was a pioneer in efforts to determine the “character and causes of long-
term changes in the personal distribution of income”.   Kuznets (1955) argued that there is a 
concentration of savings within the upper-income brackets, the effect of which is a 
“concentration of an increasing proportion of income-yielding assets” in these upper-income 
brackets (Kuznets, 1955: 7). This means there is a cycle of saving, returns and reinvestment 
that creates a cycle of inequality.  
Piketty (2014) agrees with Kuznets’ (1955) notion that the wealthy save more. He places 
great weight on the differential between the rate of return on capital (r) and the rate of growth 
of national income (g).  As long as r > g – which Piketty believes is normally the case - there 
will be ever-increasing inequality (Piketty, 2014). This concept, however, is conditioned 
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upon the restriction that all returns to capital are re-invested - that the rate of saving from 
capital income is constant (Piketty, 2014). 
Many authors disagree with Piketty (2014) regarding this restriction. Homburg (2014) 
believes that too much of Piketty’s argument hangs on the assumption that all returns on 
capital are re-invested. Both Summers (2014) and Kuznets (unknowingly) call to question 
this restriction by bringing to light the fact that “the share of the top income groups shows no 
rise over time” (Kuznets, 1955: 8) despite the “cumulative effect of savings”.  
Kuznets (1955) stated that the second and more important piece of the inequality puzzle 
resides in “the industrial structure of the income distribution” (Kuznets, 1955). In early stages 
of economic growth, growth is accompanied by a movement away from agriculture and 
increasing urbanization and industrialization.   As industrialization occurs there is a marked 
and significant increase in inequality as those working in urban areas earn more than those 
working in the rural areas (Kuznets, 1955).  As this process continues and the population 
becomes more industrialized, inequality slowly begins to decrease (Kuznets, 1955). 
Therefore, as countries experience economic growth, income inequality initially widens, but 
it narrows as countries become more developed. 
Piketty (2014) however posits that economic inequality is the natural order of things and 
will always automatically increase due to a higher propensity on the part of the wealthy to 
save and reinvest.  
The question that arises if Piketty (2014) is correct in his assertion that inequality will rise 
automatically, is why is this problematic? 
According to Nattrass and Seekings (2001), high levels of economic inequality are 
problematic because they undermine any notion of equal opportunity. Inequality of income 
translates into inequality of access to good quality education, inequality of access to effective 
healthcare, as well as inequality in the realization of basic human rights such as access to 
acceptable sanitation and access to clean drinking. Such inequalities translate into unequal 
opportunity and inequality persists in what can become a perpetual cycle. Scanlon (2014: 2) 
notes that “economic inequality undermines the fairness of the economic system itself”.  
This problem is illustrated in South Africa, which has one of the highest levels of income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient in the world (World Bank, 2014). The poor 
become trapped in the cycle of poverty and are unable to escape because they have very little 
access to capability enhancing opportunities such as a good education. Not only do the poor 
not have access to productive opportunities, but their chances of escaping poverty are 
severely inhibited by the absence of key supporting elements such as clean drinking water, 
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adequate shelter, food and healthcare.  The World Bank (2012: 1) notes: “ An equitable 
society would not allow circumstances over which the individual has no control to influence 
her or his basic opportunities after birth: ideally, only the person’s effort, innate talent, 
choices in life, and, to an extent, sheer luck, would be the influencing forces. This is at the 
core of the equality of opportunity principle, which provides a powerful platform for the 
formulation of social and economic policy - one of the rare policy goals on which a political 
consensus is easier to achieve.” 
Inequality also undermines both social cohesion and social progress (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001). In order to achieve both economic as well as socio-economic development, 
inequality must be addressed (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001)  
To combat high levels of inequality, a clear understanding of the causes of inequality is 
needed.  Only then can more strategically effective policies to combat the problem be 
developed. 
A number of authors (van der Berg (2010), World Bank (2012), Barros et al (2010)) 
suggest that the causes of inequality stem from labour market outcomes and not from capital 
ownership as Piketty (2014) claims. Central to this claim is that the major driver of inequality 
is income inequality, and that differences in income are a direct translation of wage 
differentials in the labour market (van der Berg, 2010). In order to combat inequality 
proposed solutions must strike at the heart of this problem. Van der Berg (2010) suggests that 
the only way in which inequality in South Africa can meaningfully be decreased is by 
ensuring more equal labour market outcomes. Van der Berg (2010) argues that the wage 
earned by an individual is a function of their educational attainment or level of skill (also a 
function of educational attainment). Workers who are more educated or have higher skill 
levels receive what is called a skills premium.  It is this premium that authors such as Lustig 
et al (2012) and van der Berg (2010) believe to be behind wage differentials and therefore 
income inequality.  
In order to achieve more equal wage/earnings outcomes, there must be an improvement in 
education so as to increase the supply of skilled labour sufficiently to decrease the skill 
premium received by educated workers.  
This approach towards combatting inequality has shown promise in South America with 
decreasing levels of inequality in Brazil, Chile and Argentina (Barros et al, 2010). The 
literature suggests that the primary difference in the approach towards inequality taken by 
countries like Brazil and Argentina and in the approach taken by South Africa, is that in 
Argentina and Brazil the idea that inequality is derived from the labour market takes centre-
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stage in the processes through which it is combatted (Barros et al, 2010). By focusing on 
bringing down the skills premium Brazil, Argentina and Chile have achieved significant 
reductions in levels of inequality (Barros et al, 2010) whereas South Africa has not. 
This approach towards combatting inequality is in sharp contrast to Nattrass and Seekings’ 
(2001) proposal that low wage job creation is the key to solving problems of inequality.   
This research seeks to test which of the potential policy approaches - increased education, 
low-level job creation and increased coverage of transfer payments – is most effective in 
reducing inequality.  
 
1.2 Goals of the research 
The goal of the research is to determine the extent to which inequality in South Africa 
originates within the labour market and therefore requires a reduction in the wage premium 
between skilled and unskilled workers for inequality meaningfully to be reduced.  The 
findings will further the understanding of the dynamics of inequality in South Africa and may 
prove useful in guiding policies aimed at reducing current high levels of inequality in South 
Africa. 
   
1.3 Methodology 
The study demonstrates that a viable solution to the problem of inequality in South Africa lies 
within the labour market using the Gini Coefficient (the most widely used measure of 
inequality) and the accompanying Lorenz curve. It demonstrates that because inequality 
derives from wage differentials that exist in the labour market, in order to decrease inequality 
it is necessary to reduce the wage premium currently paid to skilled labour.  This suggests 
that an increase in the supply of skilled labour will lower the Gini coefficient and reduce 
inequality.  
This concept will be contrasted to a similar experiment in which the effect of a decrease in 
unemployment is brought about by an increase in low-income jobs - as is a common policy 
objective of many governments in the fight against inequality - on the Gini coefficient is 
ascertained.  
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The study also investigates transfer payments as a measure that can be used to combat 
inequality.  This approach will be contrasted with employment creation and skills premium 
narrowing.  
The results show that a far more significant and sustainable response in the Gini 
coefficient will be seen as a consequence of the increase in the supply of skilled labour. They 
also show that increasing employment by creating many more low-income jobs, while having 
a fairly significant effect on poverty, will have little effect on overall inequality. While 
transfer payments may have a significant initial effect on inequality, this approach is once-off 
and does not sustainably contribute to consistently declining inequality over time. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the study 
The first section of the literature review in Chapter 2 will examine the nature of inequality, 
looking into its persistence and the reasons why it continues to occur. In this section the 
relationship between inequality, poverty and growth will also be discussed in order to 
determine the importance of inequality in the context of poverty and economic growth. The 
second section will contextually examine the South African ‘situation’ in terms of poverty, 
inequality and growth, while also taking a close look at the policy approaches undertaken by 
the government in response to high levels of inequality and poverty. The effectiveness of 
these policies will be scrutinized.  
Chapter 3 looks at countries who not too long ago were facing extreme levels of 
inequality, but who managed to reduce this inequality through imaginative and well thought-
out policies. This section will also explore recent literature regarding how the combination of 
changes in the skill premium and contextual factors affect the way changes in the returns to 
different levels of education impact inequality.  
Chapter 4 summarises the methods to be used in determining how the implementation of 
transfer payments, a decrease in unemployment and a narrowing of the skill premium will 
each individually impact inequality. Chapter 5 discusses the results of the research. Chapter 6 
concludes.  
It is important to note that this study merely explores hypothetical approaches to 
combatting inequality.  While its conclusions provide important policy recommendations for 
reducing inequality, the ‘how’ behind the way or process/es through which these policy 
measures can be attained or realised (in order to then decrease inequality) is not within the 
scope of this study. 
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1.5 Ethical issues 
As the research makes use only of data that is in the public domain, no ethical issues other 
than the requirements of objectivity and avoiding bias were encountered. 
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CHAPTER TWO: INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 
 
2.1 Causes of inequality 
Simon Kuznets (1955: 2) was a pioneer in his effort to determine the “character and causes of 
long-term changes in the personal distribution of income”. Although many have come after 
him, his work still stands as a hallmark in the discourse of distribution economics. He 
attempted to establish some sort of pattern or trend regarding the inequality of income 
distribution in the course of a country’s economic growth.  He sought to explain the factors 
determining the trends of income inequality over time (Kuznets, 1955).  
Although he experienced a scarcity of data Kuznets attempted to show that prior to the 
World Wars (between the years 1880 and 1913) countries such as the United States, Prussia 
and the United Kingdom experienced high levels of inequality with large concentrations of 
wealth (Kuznets, 1955). However, his data suggested that, although high levels of inequality 
were displayed prior to the World Wars, there was a marked reduction in inequality over 
time.  The income held by the top quintiles decreased in post-war times and the income held 
by the bottom quintiles began to increase - demonstrating a trend of diminishing inequality 
(Kuznets, 1955). 
In his attempt at explaining these trends (which he believes come very close to 
guesswork), Kuznets (1955) states that “we are at a relatively early stage in a long process of 
interplay among tentative summaries of evidence”.  Therefore his work is merely a building 
block for further advancements in the conception and understanding of inequality. 
The first reason given by Kuznets (1955) regarding the mechanics behind increasing 
inequality is the notion that there is a concentration of savings within the upper-income 
brackets - “According to all recent studies of the appointment of income between 
consumption and savings, only the upper-income groups save” (Kuznets, 1955: 7). The 
effect, holding other factors constant, of inequality in savings levels is that (assuming 
continuous reinvestment) there would be a “concentration of an increasing proportion of 
income-yielding assets” in the upper-income brackets (Kuznets, 1955: 7). This means there is 
almost a continuous cycle of saving, returns and reinvestment that perpetuates inequality. 
Although Kuznets (1955) hypothesized this in 1955, the notion that the wealthy save 
more, or that those who are not wealthy do not (or often cannot) save, is supported by other 
authors of his time as well as more contemporary authors. Kaldor (1956) agreed that the 
wealthy have a higher marginal propensity to save than the poor. He suggested that inequality 
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is actually necessary for economic growth. In a position of high initial inequality of income, 
there will be high levels of aggregate saving by the wealthy (due to their higher marginal 
propensity to save) (Kaldor, 1956). This in turn, Kaldor (1956) argued, will result in higher 
capital accumulation, which in turn equates to higher economic growth. The result, Marniesse 
and Peccoud (2003) note is that “Because of the correlation between savings and the growth 
rate, unequal economies will have higher growth”. Kaldor’s (1956) theory of the positive 
relationship between growth and inequality has been successfully challenged by 
contemporary authors.  This will, however, be discussed later in this section. 
Thomas Piketty (2014), the author of Capital in the Twenty-First Century agrees with 
Kuznets’ (1955) earlier notion that the wealthy save more than the poor or middle classes. He 
places great weight on the differential between r and g (where r is the rate of return on capital 
while g is the rate of growth of national income), saying that as long as r > g there will be 
ever-increasing inequality (Piketty, 2014). This concept, however, is conditioned upon the 
restriction that all returns to capital are re-invested - that the rate of saving from capital 
income is constant (Piketty, 2014).  
Many authors disagree with Piketty (2014) regarding this restriction. Homburg (2014) 
believes that too much of Piketty’s argument hangs on the above restrictive assumption (that 
all returns on capital are re-invested). While both Summers (2014) and Kuznets 
(unknowingly) call to question this restriction by bringing to light the fact that “the share of 
the top income groups shows no rise over time” (Kuznets, 1955: 8) despite the “cumulative 
effect of savings”. Summers (2014) illustrates this by comparing Forbes’ lists of wealthiest 
Americans in 1982 and 2012.  He found that less than one tenth of the 1982 list was also 
found on the 2012 list.  Summers 92014) notes this should not be the case if the wealth was 
re-invested as posited by Piketty (2014).  Summers (2014) also noted that the share of people 
on this list who inherited their wealth is in sharp decline.  
Summers (2014) goes on to say that it would make more sense that those with less wealth 
would save - so as to accumulate some wealth. Summers (2014) argues that the world is 
changing.  Globalisation has made possible returns on labour that far exceed returns on 
capital; this is the case concerning the gains experienced by a significant amount of 
individuals who reside in the top 1% of wealth (Summers, 2014).  
Kuznets (1955) attributed the lack of a rise in the share of top-income groups to 
“legislative interference” and “political decisions” - for example government actions such as 
induced inflation or harsh progressive taxation which erode the economic value of 
accumulated wealth. Another reason would be the need for businesses to maintain pace with 
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the development of the rest of the world as new industries establish themselves.  Those 
individuals that have made their fortunes in other industries may find themselves being 
pushed out of the market or struggling to keep up with the pace of the rest of the world.  
Kuznets (1955: 10) concludes that “the successful and great entrepreneurs of today are rarely 
the sons of the great and successful entrepreneurs of yesterday”.  
Kuznets (1955) believed that besides saving done by the upper income-brackets, 
inequality has another source. The second piece to the puzzle resides in “the industrial 
structure of the income distribution” (Kuznets, 1955). In early stages of economic growth, 
growth is accompanied by a movement away from agriculture - a process known as 
industrialisation (Kuznets, 1955).  
Kuznets (1955) provided the following example by way of illustration.  First assume that 
the income distribution of a total population is a combination of the income distributions of 
both the rural (agricultural) and urban (industrial) populations. The average per capita income 
of the rural population is less than that of the urban population, so as industrialisation occurs, 
there will be movement away from the rural population into the urban population (where per 
capita income is higher) Initially, Kuznets (1955) noted from available data for the United 
States, there will be little inequality as no industrialisation has occurred. Then as 
industrialisation occurs there is a marked and significant increase in inequality as those 
working in the urban population earn more than those working in the rural population 
(Kuznets, 1955). However, as this process continues and the population becomes more 
industrialized, inequality slowly begins to decrease (Kuznets, 1955).  
What can be taken from this is that as countries experience economic growth, an initial 
widening of income inequality occurs (and is demonstrated empirically).  But as countries 
become more developed as a result of industrialisation, inequality narrows. This is illustrated 
by the Kuznets curve shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Kuznets curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Higginson and Williamson, 1999) 
 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, Kuznets (1955) theorizes that initially, before periods of growth, 
there is not much inequality, but as income increases as the country in question experiences 
growth (develops) there is an initial significant increase in inequality. However, as 
development continues and more growth is experienced there is a decrease in inequality 
(Kuznets, 1955). Growth in the form of development first increases inequality and then 
decreases inequality.  Following a period of continued development growth can be “shared by 
everyone” (Kuznets, 1955).  
Kuznets (1955) theory appeared to be supported by the evidence at the time.  Empirically 
the countries who were still experiencing high levels of inequality were the ”developing 
countries” (Africa, Asia and South America) which had not experienced the same levels of 
growth experienced by the developed countries (Europe and the United States). Developing 
countries which are experiencing high levels of income inequality are on the rising part of the 
Kuznets curve.  With further development through economic growth it is plausible that rates 
of inequality would diminish as development takes place (Kuznets, 1955).  
Kuznets (1955) noted, however, that although the available evidence and theory seemed to 
fit together, it is dangerous to assume that the inequalities experienced in developing 
countries is a necessary requirement for the future diminishment of inequality, or that 
developing nations will automatically follow the same path of the developed nations 
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(Kuznets, 1955). However, it would also be dangerous to ignore these trends and patterns 
completely in searching for solutions to problems of inequality (Kuznets, 1955). 
 
2.2 Growth and inequality 
Kuznets (1955) disagreed with Kaldor’s (1956) hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between growth and inequality. Bourguignon (2003: 71) states that “poverty reduction in a 
given country and at a given point of time is fully determined by the rate of growth of the 
mean income of the population and the change in the distribution of income”. Ravallion 
(2001) agrees, noting that the extent to which growth can diminish poverty lies between the 
interactions between inequality and growth.  
Bourguignon (2003) provides a few facts on the relationship between growth, inequality 
and poverty. First, he demonstrates that both growth and inequality have major roles in 
generating changes in poverty (Bourguignon, 2003). The effect of changes in income and 
inequality depend on the initial levels of both.  Inequality dampens the effect of growth on 
poverty (Bourguignon, 2003). The lower the levels of inequality in a country, the more 
effectively growth will reduce poverty. High levels of growth in the context of high levels of 
inequality will lead to a much smaller reduction in poverty than high levels of growth 
accompanied by low levels of inequality (Bourguignon, 2003).  
The obvious outcome is that in order to effectively combat poverty, a nation must lower 
inequality.  This Bourguignon (2003) notes is the most efficient way to fight poverty. 
Bourguignon (2003: 83) concludes that “both growth and distribution elasticity of poverty 
depend positively on the level of development, and negatively on the degree of inequality”. 
Therefore effective redistribution policies may yield a “double dividend”.  They not only 
reduce poverty today, but also accelerate poverty reduction in the future (Bourguignon, 
2003). 
Marniesse and Peccoud (2003) believe that the link between development and the 
evolution of inequality is heavily country-dependent. They believe that initial conditions 
(which are country-specific) play a large role in the relationship between growth, poverty and 
inequality for any given country. Therefore they believe that the Kuznets curve is relevant to 
many countries (Marniesse and Peccoud, 2003). Kanbur (2011) agrees that the Kuznets curve 
is relevant today, but argues that development does not only refer to growth.  It refers also to 
many other important aspects of a country, such as infrastructure and effective public 
services. Growth is essential for development, but how that growth is harnessed is critical. If 
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the growth is harnessed correctly, development (achieved through this harnessed growth) 
should start to diminish inequality as well as poverty (Kanbur, 2011). 
Today economists agree that inequality has a negative impact on economic growth 
(Marniesse and Peccoud, 2003). There are two obvious channels through which economic 
growth is hampered by inequality (Marniesse and Peccoud, 2003). There is a socio-political 
argument that insists that when there is inequality in a democratic context, there will be a 
high demand for income redistribution, a part of which will occur through strong progressive 
taxation (Marniesse and Peccoud, 2003). This in turn will discourage the rich from investing 
or even remaining in the country in question.  This will affect growth through the traditional 
channels of the economy (Marniesse and Peccoud, 2003).  
Dercon (2003) posits that the imperfect nature of credit markets also leads to sub-optimal 
credit access for the poor. Because markets are imperfect, an individual’s access to credit is 
dependent on both their income and their collateral. As a result, the “unequal distribution of 
wealth has an impact on both removing an individual from poverty (poverty traps for those 
who cannot borrow to improve their income) and the growth rate (non-financing of 
economically viable projects)” (Dercon, 2003: 48).  
 
2.3 Summary and conclusion 
 
The literature highlights that not only is inequality harmful in a socio-economic sense, but it 
is also harmful towards development, growth and the eradication of poverty. As Kuznets 
(1955) explained, we cannot simply assume that as development continues there will be a 
decline in levels of inequality in developing nations. We also cannot simply ignore the 
empirical evidence suggesting that it is possible that inequality is a symptom of early 
development. What we can do is attempt to find the kind of development that will decrease 
widespread income inequality.  Alternatively we can attempt to find a way to decrease 
inequality so that growth becomes more effective in both decreasing poverty, fostering 
development and then further decreasing inequality.  This is the “double dividend” to which 
Bourguignon (2003) referred. 
In the next chapter reasons for South Africa’s very high inequality are discussed.  Brazil’s 
experience of reducing very wide inequality is then examined for possible lessons for South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3: A COMPARISON OF INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND 
BRAZIL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank (2014) South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the 
world. A comparison of South Africa’s Gini Coefficient with other countries is shown in 
Figure 2. This confirms South Africa’s exceptionally high level of income inequality.  
 
Figure 2: Global comparison of income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: World Bank, 2014) 
 
3.2 The role of Apartheid 
South Africa’s exceptionally high levels of income inequality must be understood in the 
context of its history. This history is well known and the direct consequences of it are 
abundantly clear today. Prior to the end of Apartheid all individuals who fell under the 
description of “Non-White”, held few rights in the eyes of the ruling government at the time 
(Gelb, 2003). This regime was characterised, amongst other things, by the displacement of 
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“Non-Whites” (through the Group Areas Act) that found the majority of the population 
occupying a minority of the land, and with pitiful access to education that was taught in a 
language not endemic to the ‘non-white’ population, rendering it unproductive  (Møller, 
1998).  There was a general disregard towards of basic human rights for the ‘non-white’ 
population of South Africa - universal rights that are now constitutional (Møller, 1998). On 
top of this, in terms of earning a living it was practically impossible for a black individual to 
earn a decent living. ‘Blacks would get paid much less than whites for doing the same job 
(Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Therefore racial discrimination was an important determinant 
of wage inequality (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001).  
Nattrass and Seekings (2001) believe that the majority of inequality today is still derived 
from the labour market. It was not until the early 1970’s that there was a decline in the impact 
of racial discrimination in wage determination (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). According to 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001: 51), between the early 1970’s and 1993 “the contribution of 
racial discrimination to wage determination is estimated to have dropped from 20 to 12 
percent of the average black wage”. At this time there was also upward mobility into better-
paying occupations, which raised the wages of many black employees (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001). Although there was a clear decline in the gap between the wages received 
by white and black employees between the early 1970’s and 1993, by 1993 the average 
earnings of whites was still five times the average earnings of blacks (Nattrass and Seekings, 
2001).  
By the end of Apartheid and the advent of democracy in 1994, at the widespread effects of 
apartheid were apparent to anyone who cared to look. A constitutional mandate was taken on 
by the South African Government to uplift those people who had been previously 
disadvantaged, making promises to effect widespread redistribution and combat acute 
poverty. 
 
3.3 Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
It is clear that race is still a significant factor in inequality in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001) note, however, that the racial gap in terms of earnings, assets 
and general access to things like good quality healthcare and education can no longer be 
explained by discrimination. The racial wage gap is now explained almost completely by 
factors such as “differences in education and skill, location (urban and rural), and economic 
sector” (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 52). Therefore, although discrimination does not 
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explain current trends of inequality and poverty, the remnants of an era defined by 
discrimination are still significant. It is black workers who have the lowest education 
qualifications, who live primarily in rural areas and who have the highest concentration of 
workers in the low-paying informal sectors such as agriculture and domestic self-employment 
(Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). However, black workers who are educated can command up 
to an extra 8% on wages and salaries for every extra year of primary education, an extra 16% 
for every year of secondary education and up to an extra 29% for every year of tertiary 
education (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 52).  
Although these estimated outcomes sound promising when looking for solutions to 
continued very high inequality, acquiring good quality education in reality is easier said than 
done. Also, although higher paid educated black workers change the composition of 
inequality they do not reduce inequality as a whole (see Figure 2).  This highlights an 
institutional problem in the cycle of inequality that is not racial in nature (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001).  
The difference in earnings between rural and urban workers brings to mind Kuznets 
conception of economic development and inequality. What is seen here is that, contextually 
speaking, his theory is applicable.  Those who work and live in rural areas earn the lowest 
wages - and this accounts for a substantial amount of nationwide inequality. This raises the 
possibility that inequality in South Africa may be a symptom of early development. 
According to the most recent calculations done by the World Bank, South Africa, with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.65, is currently the most unequal country in the world (World Bank, 
2014). Woolard et al (2009) found that between 1993 and 2008 the top decile (the richest 
10% of the population) in South Africa increased their income share from 54 percent of total 
income to 58 percent. They also found that during this period, the bottom 40 percent of the 
population increased their portion of national income by 5 percent (Woolard et al, 2009). 
Thus the only groups who gained in terms of income share were the top 10 percent and the 
bottom 40 percent (Woolard et al, 2009).  
Over the period 1993 to 2008 the Gini coefficient increased. However, this cannot all be 
attributed to income inequality between different race groups. Using the Gini coefficient and 
the Theil index (which allows for the decomposition of inequality into different groups with 
each group having a different share that it contributes towards total inequality) Woolard et al 
(2009) were better able to understand the nature of inequality in South Africa.  The authors 
(Woolard et al, 2009) found that the within-race inequality occurring in the African, 
Coloured, White and Asian/Indian groups all increased steadily between 1993 and 2008. The 
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African population has the highest within-race inequality in the sample, while the white 
population has the lowest within-race inequality (Woolard et al, 2009).  
Given South Africa’s history, one would expect between-race inequality to be the biggest 
driver of total income inequality in South Africa but this is not the case. Woolard et al (2009) 
established that between-race inequality (inequality between whites and Africans for 
example) was only responsible for 41 percent of total inequality.  The other 59 percent of 
inequality was driven by the within-race inequality (Woolard et al, 2009). 
Although income inequality between races is smaller than income inequality within races, 
South Africa’s within-race contribution “is amongst the highest in the world - if not the 
highest” (Leibrandt et al, 1999: 20).  
It must be noted however that between-race inequality has shown improvement, most 
dramatically between 1993 and 2000, and continues to decrease (Bhorat and van der 
Westhuizen, 2012).  While the outcomes were not identical numerically, and slightly 
different time segments were used, the findings just mentioned are supported also by Bhorat 
and Van der Westhuizen (2012), Leibrandt et al (1999), Gelb (2005), Bhorat et al (2000) and 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001).  
Why has inequality worsened since 1993? Nattrass and Seekings (2001: 60) believe that a 
central aspect in the reduction of both inequality and poverty is job creation, as they hold that 
“access to wage employment is a key determinant of inequality in South Africa”. They argue 
that considering that such a massive portion of the workforce is unemployed, job creation has 
to take centre-stage of any strategy aimed at bringing about a significant or sustainable 
decrease in inequality (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). The outcomes of government policy in 
growing the economy and promoting job creation are therefore critical in considerations 
regarding the causes worsening levels of inequality.  
In 1998 the ANC adopted orthodox economic policy in the form of GEAR - a strategy 
premised on increasing growth, employment and redistribution. A core tenet of this policy 
was to reduce the government deficit, and by complying with orthodox notions regarding 
economic policy foreign investors would be attracted to South Africa.  The outcome Nattrass 
and Seekings (2001: 61) suggest is that “investment and output growth has been 
disappointing, and employment has declined”.  
There is mounting evidence, which suggests that anti-inflationary policies undermined 
growth in developing countries, including South Africa (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). 
Another potential problem could be that the continuation of “trade liberalization in the 
absence of labour-market reforms” (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 61) resulted in employment 
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losses.  Import-competing industries were hit hard while at the same time exporting industries 
have become increasingly capital-intensive (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001).  
The continual growth of wages, even when demand is low, also contributes to decreasing 
employment, while the minimum-wage-setting machinery of South Africa has allowed big 
unions to extend these wages across entire industries, harming smaller firms that are more 
labour-intensive (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Promises made in the GEAR document that 
wage agreements would be sensitive to “regional labour market conditions, the diversity of 
skills levels in firms of varying size, location or capital intensity” have not been fulfilled 
(Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 62). On the contrary, labour market regulation has tightened, 
“and even in areas earmarked as Industrial Development Zones, labour regulations and 
minimum wages apply, with the result that only large capital-intensive megaprojects have 
been attracted there (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 62).   
Higher wages and decreasing employment have made the economy more capital-intensive 
- which is not good for job creation (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). So, Nattrass and Seekings 
(2001) suggest, a large portion of rising inequality is explained by a combination of increased 
wages and falling employment.  
 
3.4 Impact of transfer payments 
Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen (2012) and Bhorat et al (2000) claim that growth post 1994, 
has been pro-poor – the income share held by those deemed as poor has increased over this 
time. This finding can be judged against those of Bourguignon (2003) discussed above which 
emphasized the ability of economic growth to diminish poverty through the channelling of 
growth through the economy. An exception to this rule was that the impact of growth on 
poverty (as well as possibly through the same channels, its impact on inequality) could be 
hampered by present levels of inequality which would render any channelling of economic 
growth to the poor less effective (Bourguignon, 2003). This would appear to be the case in 
South Africa.  
Bhorat et al (2000) estimate that the only reason that growth post-1994 was pro-poor was 
because of the introduction of social grants. They show that without the social grants the poor 
in fact experienced a declining income share (Bhorat et al, 2000). Without grants, the upper 
income brackets were the only ones who gained in income share.  The finding by Woolard et 
al (2009) that the lower 40 percent of the economy showed modest increases in income share 
can be attributed to transfer payments by government to the poor. Bhorat et al (2000: 48) note 
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that “in 2005, income inequality amongst the African population would have been 0.71 in the 
absence of the provision of social grants, when grant income is included the Gini coefficient 
declines to 0.61”.  
Woolard et al (2009) state that grant income, or transfer payments, are not effective in 
decreasing inequality. This may be true in the active sense of the notion, or in the sense that 
employing more grants now may not render a significant change in the state of distribution. 
However, it is clear that without transfer payments inequality would be far worse than is 
currently. Without grant income, a significant portion of households/individuals in the 
economy would have no income whatsoever (Gumede, 2009). 
Although grant income has prevented an even worse distribution of income there is 
concern that the rate at which they are being rolled may not be sustainable. Bhorat et al 
(2000: 56) suggest that the state “should consider implementing complementary policy 
measures to the roll out of grant income, such as strengthening labour market policies and the 
education system”. This idea that the solution to inequality can be found in the labour market 
and through it the education system is a view widely held by many authors and will be 
elaborated on in the next section. 
 
3.5 Importance of the labour market and education 
Given South Africa’s extremely high levels of unemployment, it would seem likely that 
inequality is driven by the 30% of the population who earn nothing at all (when using the 
broad definition of unemployment) (Leibrandt et al, 1999). Therefore, following from this it 
would make sense that wage income is a key determinant of income inequality (Leibrandt et 
al, 1999). The suggestion is that the biggest driving force of inequality lies in the labour 
market. This notion is supported by many authors including Nattrass and Seekings (2001), 
Leibrandt et al (1999), Woolard et al (2009) and Gelb (2003). The most substantial root of 
inequality is said to involve the wage income received (or not received) by 
households/individuals in a population.  One could assume that much of the dynamics driving 
inequality would involve households where there are no individuals employed (Leibrandt et 
al, 1999). 
Woolard et al (2009) demonstrate the importance of labour in determining inequality by 
showing that the top deciles of the national income-share also display the highest rates of 
labour force absorption and participation. Conversely, the lower deciles of the national 
income-share have high rates of labour force participation, but much lower rates of labour 
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force absorption (Woolard et al, 2009). Therefore, it is difficult for people in the lower 
income-share population to find work and resultantly they experience high levels of 
unemployment.  
The reason why there are much higher rates of labour absorption in the higher deciles is 
given by Woolard et al (2009) who suggest it is because the upper decile of national income-
share has access to good quality education, and hence more access to skills. 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001) likewise place great weight on the value of education in the 
dynamics of inequality. Education, or the skills learned through education, is/are imperative 
because the differences in skills held, or differences in education attained, ultimately 
determine the wage received.  Wage differentials are therefore a direct product of skills 
differentials, with low levels of skill begetting low wages (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). 
When applying this notion to the South African situation we can see that “if it were possible 
to include a measure of the different quality of education received by white and black 
workers (or rich and poor workers), then education would probably be able to explain an even 
greater portion of wage inequality” (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001: 52). 
Gelb (2003) agrees that the root of inequality lies within the labour market, and has to do 
with wages received (or not received) and that this amount is for the most part dictated by the 
level of education and hence skill attainment. This is demonstrated by the fact that the high 
earners within the economy are all in the managerial or professional categories (areas 
requiring some level of formal education and skills) while the low income-earners are to be 
found in the informal sector for the most part where the demand is for unskilled or low-
skilled labour (Gelb, 2003).  
Lewis (2001: 46) states: “there is some evidence to suggest that trade-liberalisation and 
increased trade …have induced a structural change in production towards capital-intensive 
sectors… South Africa has a low and declining share of exports that use unskilled labour, and 
a high share using more skilled labour”.  This view is synonymous with Nattrass and 
Seeking’s (2001) critique of GEAR. Gelb (2003) judges this to be a “counterintuitive 
outcome” taking into account South Africa’s abundant supply of unskilled labour.  
Edwards (1999) believes that the main driver of unemployment in the areas of the 
economy that require relatively little to no skill, has been labour-displacing technical change. 
A structural change such as this favours those with higher levels of education and “further 
entrenches inequality” (Gelb, 2003: 20).  
The structure of these variables explains South Africa’s high levels of poverty, 
unemployment and resultant inequality. It can be concluded that inequality for the greater 
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part is derived out of labour market placement (wage income received), which itself is a 
primary derivative of education received and skills attained. 
Van der Berg (2010) refers to South Africa as a middle-income country with low-income 
country indicators - what he calls a “dual economy”. He agrees that South Africa’s racialised 
past offers only a small part of the explanation for current trends in poverty and inequality. 
Van der Berg (2010: 6) agrees with the sentiments of both Bourguignon (2003) and Ravallion 
(2001) regarding inequality and growth, believing that high levels of inequality dampen the 
positive effects of growth on poverty reduction; “sharp increases in inequality can overturn 
the effect of even large growth episodes. Thus growth and trends in poverty jointly determine 
trends in poverty.” 
Van der Berg (2010) also holds that between-race inequality is decreasing while within-
race inequality is increasing. He goes on to state that “ By far the largest share of overall 
current income is derived from the labour market” and believes that “most income inequality 
originates in the labour market, through the distribution of jobs and the wage formation 
process…differentials in wage earnings per household statistically explain 77,9% of 
inequality” (van den Berg, 2010: 15-16). Although van der Berg (2010) believes that social 
grants have little effect on the level of inequality (in accordance with the views of Woolard et 
al (2009)), he does not disregard the notion that if there were no social grants some 
households would receive no income at all, worsening levels of inequality. He suggests that 
the central role of social grants has been the reduction of poverty, and it is in this area that 
grants have been successful (Van der Berg, 2010). When it comes to inequality however, 
social grants have not shown promise in terms of reducing inequality.  There is however 
evidence that social grants prevent the widening or worsening of inequality - that without 
social grants, levels of inequality would be worse. 
Seeing as labour market outcomes explain such a big portion of inequality, it follows that 
more equal labour market outcomes (more equal earnings and wages) are a primary concern 
in achieving a decline in inequality (van der Berg, 2010). Van der Berg (2010) warns that if 
there are not more equal labour outcomes, aggregate inequality will remain high, which will 
encourage direct labour market interventions such as universal minimum wages. Nattrass and 
Seekings (2001) have warned that such an outcome will be unhealthy for the South African 
economy as it will retard low-income job creation. 
Van der Berg (2010) however strongly disagrees with Nattrass and Seekings (2001) claim 
that job creation is the solution to rampant inequality. Using simulations based on IES2000 
data  van der Berg (2010: 16) shows that jobs would have a more beneficial effect on poverty 
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than on inequality – “2,5 million additional jobs would reduce the Gini Coefficient by only 
about 0,033, but would reduce the poverty headcount ratio by almost 9 percentage points”. In 
order to significantly affect aggregate income distribution, the pattern of wage inequality 
itself needs to change (van der Berg, 2010). Moreover, there is a direct link between both the 
productivity of workers and the wage they receive and education - the higher the levels of 
educational attainment, the more productive the worker and the higher the wage the worker 
gets paid (van der Berg, 2010).  This is then a reflection of the much higher demand for more 
educated workers (exemplified by the higher wage they would get paid) (van der Berg, 2010). 
Therefore, education is a central concern in labour market outcomes. 
Van der Berg (2010) notes that below a certain threshold, an extra year of education is not 
valued highly by employers.  This finding is supported by Finn et al 2015) and be further 
dissected later in this study (section 3.5.4).  In order to receive higher wages, one needs to 
complete education up to and above this threshold (van der Berg, 2010). Often in South 
Africa this threshold resides at the level of tertiary education (Finn et al, 2015). 
Anthony Atkinson, the author of the novel Inequality (2015), believes that the first steps 
towards decreasing inequality begin with a move towards “Restoring the welfare state” 
(Atkinson, 2015: 1). This would involve a direct return to progressive taxation (Atkinson, 
2015). He also proposes a “new wealth transfer tax” that would involve the taxation based on 
the wealth an individual acquires over a lifetime in the form of bequests and gifts (Atkinson, 
2015). Money from such taxation could then, Atkinson believes, be used to give a minimum 
inheritance for all on reaching the age of 18. Atkinson (2015) points out that inequality is still 
dependent upon the income people receive in the form of wages, capital income and interest 
(Atkinson, 2015). Therefore, he believes that addressing unemployment is essential in 
decreasing inequality, while also pointing out that not only is employment important, but also 
wage differentials within this area of concern (Atkinson, 2015)  
In summary, it can be concluded that although job creation may be crucial for poverty 
reduction, it will do very little to reduce overall levels of inequality (van der Berg, 2010). The 
weak education endowments of those who would be employed would only secure them a job 
with low labour-market earning potential.  Therefore even though they would be earning 
wages, these wages would be low, reducing the overall effect of job-creation on inequality 
(van der Berg, 2010).  
Instead, the solution to inequality according to van der Berg (2010) is to increase the 
levels of educational attainment - “the labour market is at the heart of inequality, and central 
to labour-market inequality is the quality and extent of education” (van der Berg, 2010: 19). 
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Increasing the quality and extent (as well as magnitude of coverage) of education offered 
would decrease the demand for ‘skilled labour’ (because skilled labour would be more 
abundant) (van der Berg, 2010). The decreased demand for ‘skilled labour’ would then result 
in a decrease in the wages paid for that type of labour – this would in turn result in more 
equal labour market outcomes and ultimately declining levels of inequality (van der Berg, 
2010).  
The next section will further explore this notion by looking at the reasons for declining 
inequality in Brazil. An examination of Brazil is appropriate as historically Brazil had a Gini 
Coefficient even higher than South Africa’s. Unlike South Africa, Brazil has succeeded in 
significantly reducing its inequality. This decline has been attributed, in part, to a declining 
“wage premium” as a result of improved education (Lustig et al, 2012). 
 
3.6 Brazil 
High levels and the overall persistence of inequality have been distinctive features of Brazil 
and many other countries in Latin America for a long time (Lustig et al, 2012). In the 1990’s 
inequality started to show signs of declining in many countries in South America (Lustig et 
al, 2012). This section of the paper will focus primarily on Brazil’s success in reducing 
inequality. 
According to Lustig et al (2012), the primary factors involved in the decline in inequality 
in Brazil (and in some other South American nations) are the demand and supply for labour 
as well as government transfers (Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT’s) to be specific). 
The three largest countries to experience significant declines in inequality in South 
America are Brazil, Argentina and Mexico (Lustig et al, 2012). In terms of context it should 
be noted that during the periods of declining inequality Argentina experienced high levels of 
growth while Mexico and Brazil experienced only moderate levels of economic growth 
(Lustig et al, 2012). What is clear is that both the levels of non-labour income inequality and 
labour-income inequality declined in all three countries, and together were responsible for a 
decline in overall income inequality (Lustig et al, 2012).  High growth was not the cause of 
these developments.  
 
3.6.1 Determinants of the Decline in Inequality in Brazil 
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Brazil is known for having historically high and persistent inequality – at some points in its 
history it was regarded as having the highest levels of inequality in the world (Lustig et al, 
2012). However, between 1998 and 2009 Brazil’s Gini coefficient declined 5.4 percentage 
points decreasing from 0.592 to 0.537 (Lustig et al, 2012). Depending on the poverty line that 
is used, this decline in inequality can account for up to 50 percent of the poverty reduction 
that occurred over this period (Lustig et al, 2012).  This reinforces the claims made earlier in 
this paper that lowered inequality can render economic growth more effective in lowering 
poverty. In order to fully decompose how this reduction in inequality was achieved, it is 
necessary to address the roles played by both labour-income and non-labour income (Lustig 
et al, 2012). 
 
 
3.6.2 Non-labour income inequality 
Barros et al (2010) found that 50 percent of the decline in income inequality can be 
attributable to a more equal distribution in household non-labour income. Non-labour income 
includes all income that is not derived from the labour-market, including income from rents, 
interest, dividends, private transfers and government transfers (Lustig et al, 2012). Lustig et 
al (2012) note that if one looks at all non-labour income (not including government transfers) 
it’s effect on income inequality is “unequalizing”. Those who earn non-labour income 
(excluding government transfers) will typically be individuals in the upper income brackets.  
Therefore this portion of non-labour income would be unequalizing (Lustig et al, 2012). 
According to Bergolo et al (2011), however, the effect of government transfers meant non-
labour income was equalizing in terms of reducing inequality. 
Soares et al (2007) believe that much of the success in achieving significant declines in 
inequality can be accorded to the positive effect of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT’s) by 
government, the primary such transfer being Bolsa La Familia.  
Before October 2003 Brazil had four CCT programmes which were then combined in 
2003 to form what we now know as the Bolsa La Familia programme.  This unification was 
done in order to make the government transfer system more efficient (Soares et al, 2007). 
The biggest premise behind the Bolsa La Familia programme are the conditionalities 
attached to the receipt of the transfers (Soares et al, 2007). The most important of these 
conditionalities is that all children of school-age were expected to maintain a 75 percent 
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attendance rate at school in order to fulfil the requirements necessary to receive this 
government transfer (Soares et al, 2007). This stipulation then progressed to require 85 
percent school attendance from all school-age children in a household (Soares et al, 2007). 
On top of this, other conditionalities required by the Bolsa La Familia programme include 
updated immunization cards for children up to six years of age, as well as regular visits to 
hospitals or healthcare centres for women who are pregnant or breastfeeding (Soares et al, 
2007). For families in extreme poverty, that have no children or pregnant women, 
conditionalities are loose, requiring only that there is participation in certain beneficial 
training programmes (Soares et al, 2007).  
According to Soares et al 2007) and Barros et al (2010), the Bolsa La Familia programme 
has been a success, with qualitative studies showing that there is overwhelming compliance 
with the conditionalities amongst poor households (Soares et al, 2007).  Authors such as 
Barros et al (2010) believe that these conditionalities have played a big role in the decline of 
inequality, most specifically the education conditionalities.  The channels through which this 
would have an effect on inequality are discussed in detail below. 
Conditionalities aside, Barros et al (2010) suggest that the effectiveness of the government 
transfers in diminishing inequality can be attributed to the coverage of the government 
transfers, and not the size or magnitude of the transfers themselves. In other words the 
success of the government transfers comes more from the fact that many people received 
them rather than from how big an amount the transfer was (Barros et al, 2010). Lustig et al 
(2012) conclude that the CCT portion of non-labour income’s effect on overall inequality was 
significant enough to negate other non-labour income and still be responsible for 50 percent 
of the decline in total income inequality  
As in Brazil, the decline in non-labour income inequality also accounts for a large portion 
of the decrease in overall income inequality in Argentina (Lustig et al, 2012). Similarly to 
Brazil, this decrease in non-labour income inequality has been attributed to the coverage of 
government transfer programmes such as the Unemployed Households Heads program 
(Lustig et al, 2012). However, during the period 2000-09 Argentina experienced high levels 
of growth.  Gasparini and Cruces (2010) believe that the decline in inequality experienced by 
Argentina in this period is a result of the petering out of the effect of technological upgrading 
as well as strong labour-intensive growth. “Market forces have been complemented with state 
action” (Lustig et al, 2012: 4). 
Mexico also had equalizing returns from government transfers.  Again this can be 
attributed to the coverage of the transfers so that the inequality within non-labour income also 
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decreased (Lustig et al, 2012). In particular the increase in the coverage of transfers for 
agricultural producers (this programme being called Procampo) as well as Mexico’s own 
CCT programme: Progressa/Oportunidades were significant.   Coverage was important as 
the majority of the expansion in household non-labour income was due to the implementation 
and the expansion of the Progresa/Oportunidades (Lustig et al, 2012). 
 
3.6.3 Labour-income inequality 
Barros et al (2010) found that the changes within the distribution of household labour-income 
per adult accounted for 51% of the decline in total income inequality in Brazil between 2001 
and 2006. This can be explained by an increase in the average labour income of working 
adults, as well as a decrease in labour-income inequality amongst the working population 
(Lustig et al, 2012).  
Langoni (2005) showed that a large portion of the increase in inequality in Brazil that had 
occurred during the 1980s and 1990s occurred as a consequence of Brazil’s educational 
system’s failure to provide a prompt response to the demands of a growing economy. This 
brings up an important aspect regarding the nature of labour-income inequality. According to 
Barros et al (2010), a major determinant of the later fall in inequality in the distribution of 
labour income per working adult is education. It is through the price and substitution effects 
of changes in the distribution of schooling that changes in the distribution of labour-income 
occurred (Barros et al, 2010)
1
.  
Barros et al (2010) note that there is a large amount of literature that documents the way in 
which education affects the distribution of labour earnings through the price and quantity 
channels. The way in which the quantity effect works is that the more education a worker has, 
the more they earn (because more education typically means higher skill levels and therefore 
more productivity) (Barros et al, 2010). Therefore, the more inequality there is in terms of the 
levels of education that are attained, the more inequality there will be in earnings from labour 
(Barros et al, 2010).  
On the other hand, the price effect involves the relationship between the amount of labour-
earnings made and the level of education achieved – the price affect determines how 
                                                          
1
 At this point it must be stated that this paper assumes a classical approach to the mechanics and workings of 
the labour market, most pertinently with regards to the accompanying theory concerning the supply and demand 
of labour. This is opposed, for example, to the post-Keynesian view of the labour market which holds that the 
supply curve of labour “does not play a role in the determination of employment and wages” – ultimately a 
repudiation of the supply and demand approach to the labour market (Bekker, 1995: 453). 
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educational inequality is turned into income inequality (Barros et al, 2010). The steeper the 
relationship between labour earnings and educational achievement, the higher the skills 
premium paid (where the skills premium is the relative returns to workers with tertiary 
education and primary education).  Conversely, the flatter the relationship between labour 
earnings and the level of educational attainment, the less inequality there will be in labour 
earnings (Barros et al, 2010).  
Therefore, in order for education to contribute to a decrease in labour-income inequality, it 
is necessary to either have a decline in the inequality of education, or conversely a flattening 
of the relationship between labour-earnings and education (Barros et al, 2010).  
In Brazil there was a reduction in the skills premium paid to workers (Lustig et al, 2012). 
This happened because there was increase in the abundance of skilled workers.  This meant 
there was an increase in the supply of skilled labour which in turn resulted in a decrease in 
the  wage paid to skilled workers (this is demonstrated through the decrease of the skills 
premium) (Lustig et al, 2012). The result then is that through higher levels of education (as a 
result of CCT programmes like Bolsa La Familia) and wider coverage, more individuals were 
able to gain a good education.  Access to education became more equal which meant that 
there was a decrease in the inequality of education (Lustig et al, 2012). As explained above, 
more equal education outcomes decrease the skills premium which in turn makes labour-
market earning outcomes more equal as well by decreasing the inequality of education 
(which starts off the entire process), and flattening of the relationship between educational 
attainment and labour earnings (which occurs because of the abundance of skilled labour and 
is resultantly a decrease in the skills premium) (Barros et al, 2010). 
 
3.6.4 The Critical Level of Schooling 
At this point it must be noted that declining inequality in educational attainment does not 
always translate into a decline in earnings inequality.  This outcome has been demonstrated in 
South Africa, where there has been a decrease in inequality in schooling, but this has not had 
an effect on persistently high levels of inequality (Finn et al, 2015). In fact, it could be the 
case that, initially, a decline in the inequality in educational attainment could first cause an 
increase in earnings inequality. However, Finn et al (2015) agree that, in the long run, 
decreases in schooling inequality will ultimately lead to decreases in earnings inequality.  
Finn et al (2015) believe that it is not as simple as stating that increasing levels of 
education will decrease levels of inequality.  There are important contextual features specific 
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to different countries that play a role in the effect that changes in education will have on 
earnings inequality. Finn et al (2015) refer to a summary statistic that has been for the most 
part overlooked by the literature surrounding this topic: namely, the year of schooling which 
separates equalizing from disequalizing increases in returns to schooling.  
Finn et al (2015) note that this summary statistic is the level of educational attainment that 
corresponds with the mean log earnings of the population, or the level of education associated 
with earning the mean log earnings of the population.  They call this statistic the critical level. 
Increases in returns to education above this level of education will be disequalizing, while 
increases in returns to education below this level will be equalizing (Finn et al, 2015).  
Another useful statistic used in conjunction with the critical level is the mean level of 
education attainment in the relevant county (Finn et al, 2015). If this level is below that of the 
critical level, then we know that the returns to education are convex in the country in 
question.  Increases in returns to education at the mean level of educational attainment and 
even somewhat above it will be equalizing in nature (Finn et al, 2015). 
This critical level, therefore, is the aforementioned context which determines how changes 
in the returns to education translate into changes in in earnings inequality (Finn et al, 2015). 
In order to decrease inequality, there must be movement towards this critical level from both 
directions - there must be a decrease in the variance around the critical level (Finn et al, 
2015).Inequality will fall if there is a decrease in the returns to education for levels higher 
than the level that corresponds to the log mean earnings, and it will be decreased for 
increased returns to education below this level. Also, if the returns to education are convex, 
then increasing the mean level of education will also be equalizing (Finn et al, 2015).  
Finn et al (2015) illustrate this concept using an example where the mean log earnings 
corresponded to a level of twelve years of education (or both primary and secondary 
education - this approximates to the critical levels for both South Africa and Brazil (Finn et 
al, 2015)). If this is the case, increases in returns to tertiary education, or education above 
twelve years would be disequalizing and decreases in returns to education above twelve years 
would be equalizing. The opposite is true for returns to education below twelve years - 
decreases in returns would be disequalizing while increases in returns would be equalizing.  
Therefore, to understand the skill premium to be the relative returns to workers with 
tertiary education in comparison to those with primary and secondary education, it can be 
seen that decreasing the skills premium equates to decreasing the variance around the critical 
level – especially if this level is 12 years, or the end of high school. 
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It follows “that a major expansion in the tertiary education system is needed to reverse the 
rising relative wage (or skill premium) that deteriorates wage-inequality” (Blom and Velez, 
2001: 24). An expansion such as this would, through the price and substitution effects 
mentioned above, increase the supply of skilled workers, thereby decreasing the skill 
premium afforded to that level of education (a decrease in the returns to education above the 
critical level) while at the same time increasing the returns to education below the critical 
level.  The variance around the critical level would decrease. An expansion of tertiary 
education would also increase the mean level of education, further reducing earnings 
inequality. 
Finn et al (2015) successfully demonstrate this theory using Brazil and South Africa as 
case studies, with special attention being paid to the 1990-2011 period. Although both 
countries experienced diminishing inequality in educational attainment, especially at the 
primary and secondary levels of education, Brazil experienced a decline in inequality while 
high levels of inequality persisted in South Africa (Finn et al, 2015). This is because in South 
Africa, returns increased at the top (above the critical level) and declined in the middle and 
lower parts of the distribution (below the critical level) (Finn et al, 2015).  
Conversely, Brazil’s average level of education and level of education associated with 
mean log earnings were both lower than South Africa.  This meant that decreases in the 
inequality of education translated into an increase in the mean level of education - implying 
increasing returns to primary and secondary education as both the mean level of education 
and the critical level rose (Finn et al, 2015).  
In addition, the premium afforded to educational attainment above the critical level (which 
in recent years can be seen as tertiary education) was comparatively smaller in South Africa, 
and has decreased in the past decade (Finn et al, 2015). 
 
3.6.5 The Kuznets Curve and Brazil  
Barros et al (2010) argue that as well as education playing a role, another important factor in 
the decline of labour-income inequality (and therefore total-income inequality) is the 
reduction in spatial and sectoral market segmentation in Brazil. Wage differentials between 
similar workers in urban and rural areas declined (Barros et al, 2010).  
This finding draws certain similarities to Kuznets’ theory of development and inequality 
mentioned earlier in this study. Kuznets (1955) posited that inequality is a part of 
development, and that a direct result of the earlier stages of development (as urbanisation and 
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industrialization begin) is inequality as people who live in metropolitan areas will earn much 
more than people in rural and agricultural areas. Seeing that Brazil has started showing 
declining inequality as well as a decrease in market segmentation, it is easy to see evidence of 
the Kuznets curve at work as Brazil continues to develop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Education Inequality amongst workers in Brazil: 1995-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(Source: Barros et al, 2010: 53) 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that “education inequality begins to decline whenever average 
schooling exceeds some threshold level” (Barros et al, 2010: 52). The concavity of the graph 
also demonstrates that moving forward education inequality should decrease at an increased 
rate (Barros et al, 2010).  In fact this reverse-relationship implies that the faster the expansion 
in education occurs, the “faster educational inequality and, consequently, income inequality 
will decline” (Barros et al, 2010: 53).  
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The relationship depicted in Figure 3 is very similar to the Kuznets curve depicted in 
Figure 1. It makes sense that the above relationship between average education and inequality 
should be linked to the original Kuznets curve that showed the relationship between 
development and inequality (Barros et al, 2010). As countries become more developed, so 
access to education increases.  The more developed they become the faster the rate of 
educational attainment (Barros et al, 2010). This, according to Barros et al (2010) is one of 
the primary ways in which Brazil achieved lower inequality. 
 
3.6.6 Lessons for South Africa 
The declining inequality experienced in Brazil can be linked to van der Berg’s (2010) 
solution to inequality in South Africa. Van der Berg (2009) believes that although creating 
employment is very important for poverty reduction, job creation is not a very effective 
weapon against inequality. Creating better and more equal educational outcomes is the 
catalyst for decreased inequality (van der Berg, 2009).  
Brazil’s successful approach towards reducing inequality is supportive of van der Berg’s 
(2009) assertion that inequality can be combatted only through better and more equal 
educational outcomes. Although van der Berg (2009: 19) states that achieving these outcomes 
in South Africa is “inauspicious” right now, their success in Brazil demonstrates that 
education is integral to any attempt at achieving a more fair and equal income distribution in 
South Africa.  
The goal of this research will be to demonstrate this finding by determining the most 
effective way in which the Gini coefficient in South Africa can be lowered. 
A similar outcome can be seen in Mexico where the decline in inequality (especially 
through the labour-income channel) can also be attributed to a decline in the skills premium 
(Lustig et al, 2012). The decline in the skills premium in Mexico occurred because of 
changes in public spending on education in the 1990’s – “these changes expanded both basic 
and middle education considerably”, although there were also market forces at play in 
decreasing the skills premium (Lustig et al, 2012: 11). 
Argentina on the other hand, which experienced high levels of growth during the period in 
question, did not achieve a fall in the skills premium through an increased supply of skilled 
labour. Lustig et al (2012: 5) conclude that in this case “during the 2000’s, demand-cum-
institutional factors are more important for the decline in the skill premium than the increase 
in the relative supply of skilled workers”.  
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Other research regarding different methods in which inequality can be decreased include 
studies of the impact of taxing the rich in an attempt to decrease after-tax inequality.  A 
Brookings Institute examination of the United States (Gale, Kearney and Orszag, 2015) 
showed that substantially higher taxation on the very wealthy was only able to reduce the 
Gini coefficient by the third decimal place.  Similarly, a study by the World Bank on South 
Africa demonstrates that South Africa’s progressive tax system does little to reduce its Gini 
coefficient (World Bank, 2014). The reason this method is not effective is because inequality 
(especially in a country as unequal as South Africa) lies across the entire income spectrum, 
not just at the top (Gale, Kearney and Orszag, 2015). 
Another method is a variation of the first approach and involves the use of higher taxes on 
the rich to provide increased transfer payments to those lying at the bottom of the income 
spectrum. In the Brookings Institute study of the US, this approach was able to reduce the 
Gini coefficient by the second decimal place.  Although this approach showed more promise 
than the first approach, the resultant effect is nonetheless very small and bordering on 
insignificant (Gale, Kearney and Orszag, 2015). Similarly, the 2014 World Bank report on 
South Africa showed that the introduction of grants reduced poverty in South Africa and 
prevented inequality from worsening, but has been unable to reduce inequality (World Bank, 
2014). 
The reason these approaches have been shown to be ineffective is because the major 
source of inequality can be found to lie within the labour market (van der Berg, 2009) and 
Lustig et al, 2012. To be more specific, the major source of income inequality is labour-
income inequality (or the wage-differentials found in the labour market), the landscape of 
which is directly shaped by differing wage premiums on account of varying levels of skill 
(van der Berg, 2009, Lustig et al, 2012 and Barros et al, 2010).  
The above two approaches are however useful in demonstrating how difficult it seems to 
be to significantly alter income inequality.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is important to note that the tests/scenarios undertaken in this section are not intended to 
directly model real outcomes. Rather, the intention is to illustrate and compare the 
hypothetical impact of different policy scenarios which are aimed at decreasing inequality. 
 
4.2 Calculating the Gini Coefficient  
The scenarios developed in this chapter make use of data from the Income and Expenditure 
Survey 2010/11 conducted by Statistics SA (Stats SA, 2012). The calculations make use of 
the household income given for 25 330 households in the sample population of the Income 
and Expenditure survey for 2010/11.  
This study aims to ascertain the effects that three separate scenarios have on inequality by 
simulating and calculating the impact they have on inequality relative to the ‘control’ level of 
inequality – the level of inequality as it stood in 2010/11.  
The manner in which inequality will be measured is the Gini coefficient. This statistic will 
be calculated by constructing the Gini coefficient’s accompanying Lorenz Curve, and using 
this curve to calculate the Gini index or statistic. 
 In order to calculate the Lorenz curve, it is necessary first to have listed the income for 
each respective household in the survey. The incomes of each household must then be ranked 
from lowest to highest to reflect the income distribution from bottom to top (Farris, 2010). 
The distribution must then be separated into deciles or ten equal segments of households from 
the bottom of the distribution to the top (Farris, 2010).  
Given that there are 25 330 households in the sample population, each decile will contain 
2 533 households. To elaborate, using the ranked list of households and their respective 
incomes the first 2 533 households on the ranked list will make up the first decile, the 2 534
th
 
household up to the 5 066
th
 household on the ranked list will make up the second decile and 
so on – until there are ten equal segments each containing 2 533 households and their 
respective incomes ranked from the lowest income in the first decile to the highest income in 
the tenth decile.  
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 provide an example of the required calculations using an illustrative 
sample population of 20 households: 
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Tables 1, 2, 3 & 4: An illustrative example of data needed for calculating the Gini Coefficient 
for an illustrative distribution of income across 20 households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Households Income 
 1 10 
2 50 
3 9 
4 0 
5 70 
6 150 
7 55 
8 68 
9 90 
10 30 
11 200 
12 13 
13 21 
14 300 
15 500 
16 65 
17 49 
18 95 
19 0 
20 10 
Table 2 
Households Income Decile 
1 0 
1 
2 0 
3 9 
2 
4 10 
5 11 
3 
6 13 
7 21 
4 
8 30 
9 49 
5 
10 50 
11 55 
6 
12 65 
13 68 
7 
14 70 
15 90 
8 
16 95 
17 150 
9 
18 200 
19 300 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
500 
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Once the sample income distribution has been ranked and placed into deciles (Table 2), the 
mean income of each decile is calculated (Table 3) (Farris, 2010). The total mean income 
across all the deciles is then calculated (Table 4) (Farris, 2010). The mean level of income for 
each decile must then be calculated as a percentage of the total mean income, after which the 
cumulative mean percentage of each decile must also be calculated (Farris, 2010). The 
cumulative mean percentage is then graphed in Figure 4 as the percentage that each decile 
represents of the population (Farris, 2010): 
 
Table 3 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Household 
Income In 
respective 
Deciles 
0 9 11 21 49 55 68 90 150 300 
0 10 13 30 50 65 70 95 200 500 
Mean Income 0 9.5 12 25.5 49.5 60 69 92.5 175 400 
Total Mean 
Income 
893 
Table 4 
Decile Population Mean Income Mean Income 
as a % of Total 
Mean Income 
Cumulative 
Mean 
Percentage 
1 0.1 0 0 0 
2 0.2 9.5 0.010638 0.010638 
3 0.3 12 0.013438 0.024076 
4 0.4 25.5 0.028555 0.052632 
5 0.5 49.5 0.055431 0.108063 
6 0.6 60 0.067189 0.175252 
7 0.7 69 0.077268 0.25252 
8 0.8 92.5 0.103583 0.356103 
9 0.9 175 0.195969 0.552072 
10 1 400 0.447928 1 
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Figure 4: Illustration of area’s that must be calculated in order to determine Gini coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Area A                    B: Areas B 
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 Lorenz curve 
Equality    
Figure 5: Lorenz curve for the hypothetical population of 20 households  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Gini coefficient is the area above the Lorenz curve (area “A” in Figure 4) divided by the 
total area underneath the line of equality, which is equal to 0.5 (Farris, 2010). The area of A 
is given by 0.5 (the total area underneath the line of equality) less the area underneath the 
Lorenz curve (area “B” in Figure 3) (Farris, 2010). 
The area underneath the Lorenz curve must therefore be calculated in order to calculate 
the area above the Lorenz curve.  This is done by calculating the area of each 0.1 population 
segment using the properties of a trapezoid: 
 
Area of each 0.1 population segment = ((b1 + b2)/2) x 0.1  (Farris, 2010) 
 
where: b1 and b2 are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the segment being 
measured. The sum of the areas of each segment is the area underneath the Lorenz curve: 
 
eg: ((b1 + b2)/2) x 0.1 
              ((0 + 0.010638)/2) x 0.1 
                   = 0.000532 
 
  
0
0.2
0.4
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Table 5: Calculating the Gini Coefficient from the Lorenz curve 
 
The 
area 
und
erne
ath 
the 
Lor
enz 
curv
e, 
area 
B is 
0.25
313
5. Using this value the area above the Lorenz curve can now be calculated: 
 
Area A = 0.5 – Area B = 0.5 – (0.253135) = 0.246865 
 
Therefore, the Gini coefficient for this distribution is: 0.246865/0.5 = 0.493729.  
 
This method of calculating the Gini coefficient will be used in the three scenarios to follow. 
 The Gini coefficient will first be calculated using the data as it was recorded in the 
2010/11 survey as a comparative/control statistic. For each scenario, the effects or outcomes 
of the scenario will be projected five years into the future ceteris paribus, starting at the 
beginning of 2011 accounting only for the changes brought about by the scenario itself as 
well as inflation year upon year.  
 
  
Cumulative Percentage                ((b1 + b2)/2) x 0.1 
0 0.000532 
0.010638 0.001736 
0.024076 0.003835 
0.052632 0.008035 
0.108063 0.014166 
0.175252 0.021389 
0.25252 0.030431 
0.356103 0.045409 
0.552072 0.077604 Area B 
1 0.05 0.253135 
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4.3 South African income distribution in 2011 
Table 6 depicts the income distribution for the sample population as it was in 2011. Applying 
the method described above for calculating the gini coefficient, the 2011 gini coefficient, or 
the ‘control’ gini can be calculated (note: numbers are rounded to the fourth decimal place): 
Table 6: Income distribution in South Africa, 2011 
 
Area under the Lorenz Curve = 0.1895 
Area above the Lorenz Curve = 0.5 - 0.1895 = 0.3105  
Control Gini = 0.3105/0.5 = 0.6201 
 
4.4 Policy Outcome 1: A ‘Social Solidarity Grant’ 
The purpose of this scenario is to determine the effects that the introduction of a new grant 
would have on the level of inequality registered in 2011. This grant is purely hypothetical and 
will be referred to as the “Social Solidarity Grant”. 
In order to determine the magnitude or possible size of the grant, as well as determine 
which individuals should receive the grant, existing grants in South Africa were examined. In 
order to be hypothetically feasible this grant must be affordable, while at the same time it 
needs to be significant enough so that it would be effective in its goal: to create social 
solidarity. 
The existing grant that seemed to most fit the above requirements is the Child Support 
Grant. In 2011, the time period under analysis, the Child Support grant was R290 per month 
(Hall, 2015). In South Africa, eligibility for grants is restricted through means testing, where 
certain financial requirements must be met in order for an individual to be eligible for a grant 
(Hall, 2015). As each grant is targeted at different social phenomena, the means testing for 
each grant is different. The means testing used for the Social Solidarity grant will be the same 
  Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Aggregate 
Income 
4574 12853 18471 25588 33809 45690 65368 101530 179836 485247 
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as the means testing used for the Child Support grant. In order to be a recipient of the Child 
Support grant in 2011, an individual must show that they earn less than R31 200 per year 
(Hall, 2015).  Therefore, in the scenario to follow, all individuals who earn less than this 
amount in the sample will be eligible for the Social Solidarity Grant (SS grant).  
In order to ‘fund’ the new grant, the top earners in the first decile will be taxed the full 
amount of the revenue required to implement the grant. 
On average there are 1.5 economically active individuals in each household (Stats SA, 
2012). Therefore, for a household to be eligible for the SS grant, it must collectively earn no 
more than R31 200 x 150% = R46 800 annually (Stats SA). It is important to note that this 
refers only to labour income. Therefore it is necessary to unpack the labour income amount 
from the total income of each household to ensure consistent and fair results. In the Income 
and Expenditure Survey, the percentage of total household income that comes from labour 
income is listed and shown in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Percentage of income from labour by decile, 2011 
 
(Source: Stats SA, 2012)  
Using this information to determine the amount of income from labour per household (if each 
household has an average of 1.5 breadwinners), eligibility for the SS grant can be confirmed 
or denied. Once this vetting process has been completed, all the houses who qualify will have 
R3 480 (R290 x 12 months) added to their annual income.  
It is important at this point to use the list of each household and its respective income 
(similarly to the example explained above). The data used in the Income and Expenditure 
Survey takes the shape of each household’s income for the year 2011. R3 480 is then added 
to each household, whose income from labour is below the threshold of R46 800. Also the 
top decile is taxed by the mean amount of the changes in the means of each decile brought 
about by the SS grant.  This amount, equal to R14 184.39 per household for the sample 
population is subtracted from the top decile’s mean average income.  
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Percentage 
of Income 
from 
Labour 
36.3% 32.3% 39% 45.6% 52.3% 62.7% 70.1% 75.4% 77.2% 76.4% 
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The list of yearly income per household (after the additions have taken place) is then 
ranked from lowest to highest, after which deciles are constructed in the same manner as 
above (each decile consisting of 2 533 households). The mean income for each decile is 
calculated and the process of calculating the Gini coefficient continues as previously 
explained.  
 
Table 8: Household income per decile before and after the Social Solidarity Grant  
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Original 
Aggregate 
Income 
2011 
4574 12853 18471 25588 33809 45690 65368 101530 179836 485247 
Aggregate 
Income 
After 
Social 
Solidarity 
Grant 
2015 
8537 17313 23268 30745 36852 48432 69290 107621 190626 498658 
 
The impact of the Social Solidarity Grant on income distribution as calculated by the Gini 
Coefficient is shown and discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5 Policy outcome 2: A decrease in unemployment 
In line with what Nattrass and Seekings (2001) believe to be the solution to persistently high 
levels of inequality, this test will determine the effect of an increase in job creation (or a 
decrease in unemployment) on the level of inequality. 
This scenario assumes that a policy is enacted by government that is successful in 
decreasing unemployment. Again, the ‘how’ involving the realisation of this ‘policy’ is not 
within the scope of this paper.  This analysis is merely an illustration of the positive effect 
that such a change in unemployment may have on inequality.  
It is assumed first that the jobs being created are low-paying jobs that pay the current 
average minimum wage and that this policy is structured in such a way that it caters only for 
people at the bottom of the distribution, whose household income is below the average 
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minimum wage.  The policy is therefore aimed at creating more income at the bottom of the 
income.  
In 2011, the minimum wage was R2 800 per month (LRS, 2011). South Africa currently 
experiences an unemployment rate of 25% (LRS, 2011). This scenario assumes that through 
policy action South Africa’s unemployment rate is decreased by 1 percentage point annually 
over five years, holding all other factors besides inflation constant, so that there is a  decrease 
in unemployment of 5% by the end of 2015. 
A 25% unemployment rate equated to 5.4 million unemployed people in South Africa in 
2022 (this statistic refers to unemployed people who are seeking work) (LRS, 2011). 5% of 
5.4 million is equal to 1 080 000 new jobs over five years, or 216 000 thousand jobs 
additional jobs per year.  
In order to apply this to the sample population, we need to first find the ratio of 
unemployed citizens in relation to the entire population. If South Africa has a population of 
51.58 million people then: 51.58million/1.08million = 47.76 (LRS, 2011). This essentially 
means that by the above definition of unemployment, for every 47.6 people in South Africa, 
there is one unemployed person who will become employed in this scenario.  
If there are on average 3.75 individuals per household, then the total population of 
individuals in the 2011 sample is: 3.75 x 25 330 = 99 051.76. Using this figure we can 
determine the number of additional jobs in the sample population (using the ratio above) as 
99 051.76/47.6 = 1 990.19 jobs at the end of the five year period, or 1990.19/5 = 398.04 new 
minimum-wage paying jobs per annum. 
However, due to the targeted nature of this hypothetical scenario, these jobs are only given 
to those at the bottom of the income distribution. If minimum wage is R33 600 per year 
(R2 800 x 12), then the part of the sample we are working with includes all households whose 
income from labour per annum is less than R33 600. For simplicity, the income from the 
additional jobs will be added to the deciles that have a mean income that is less than the 
average minimum wage per year. This means that in the sample population given by the 
Income and Expenditure Survey 2010/11, the additional jobs will be added to the bottom four 
deciles. 
Therefore 398.4 new jobs shared across the 4 deciles means 99.6 additional jobs per decile 
per year. In the calculations that follow this is rounded to 100 jobs.  As there are 2 533 
households in each decile then on average there is one additional job per every: 2533/100 = 
25 households.  
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Therefore, in the list of households and their respective income, the annual minimum wage 
will be added to the income of the 25
th
 household, and every multiple of 25 thereafter (a 
random even distribution) within the bottom four deciles until the income from 100 new jobs 
is included. This list of households and their respective incomes will then be ranked from 
smallest to largest, after which all ten deciles will be reconstructed so that the Gini 
Coefficient can be calculated. Table 9 gives the impact on income per decile after the creation 
of these 216 000 low-paying jobs per annum. 
 
Table 9: Household income per decile before and after the creation of 216 000 low-paying 
jobs per annum 
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Original 
Aggregate 
Income 
2011 
4574 12853 18471 25588 33809 45690 65368 101530 179836 485247 
Aggregate 
Income 
After 
Additional 
Jobs 2015 
8907 23527 35775 49856 65967 85731 115867 171329 295165 781413 
Aggregate 
Income 
After 
Additional 
Jobs 
(Without 
Inflation) 
7055 18636 28337 39491 52252 67907 91778 135709 233798 618952 
 
The impact of the creation of these jobs on income distribution as calculated by the Gini 
coefficient is shown in Chapter 5. 
 
4.6 Policy outcome 3: A narrowing of the skills premium 
This scenario draws its inspiration from both van der Berg (2010) and evidence in Brazil that 
suggests that inequality can best be decreased through the narrowing of the skills premium. 
This scenario therefore proposes to determine the effect that a hypothetical policy action 
undertaken by government to expand tertiary education will have on levels of inequality. 
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The scenario assumes that government initiated a ten year plan (using the Income and 
Expenditure Survey 2010/11) at the beginning of 2008 that aimed to increase the proportion 
of people who have attained tertiary education by 10% by the year 2020. Again the manner in 
which this expansion might be achieved is not in the scope of this paper. Therefore, given 
that it takes a minimum of three years to get a degree, upon the implementation of this policy 
it is intended that there will be a 1% increase in the proportion of individuals who have 
tertiary education each year starting from the beginning of 2011 and ending at the beginning 
of 2020. 
Using this annual change in the proportion of tertiary educational attainment, this scenario 
will determine the extent to which the skills premium narrows – or the extent to which returns 
at different levels of education change.  
Through the price and substitution effects an increase in the supply of skilled labour (here, 
labour which has achieved tertiary education) results in a decrease in the wage paid to that 
labour (Barros et al, 2010). It is also assumed that the increase in the supply of skilled labour 
corresponds with a decrease in the supply of unskilled labour.  Through the same channels of 
the price and substitution effects, this results in an increase in the wage paid for unskilled 
labour (Barros et al, 2010). 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of the impact of a change in the skills premium as a result of improved 
education 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The narrowing of the skills premium is illustrated in Figure 6.  As the returns to unskilled 
labour increase, the returns to skilled labour decrease. 
QUANTITY OF LABOUR 
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A
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 Finn et al (2015) argue that there is a critical level of education (the level of educational 
attainment that corresponds to mean log earnings of the population). For any level of 
education above this level, an increase in returns would be disequalizing while a decrease in 
returns would be equalizing (Finn et al, 2015). For any level of education below this level, an 
increase in returns would be equalizing while a decrease in returns would be disequalizing 
(Finn et al, 2015).  
Therefore, in this scenario the percentage-change in the level of tertiary education will be 
calculated as a proportion of the original level of tertiary educational attainment. The overall 
percentage-change for each year, relative to the initial level of tertiary educational attainment 
in that year, will be used and applied as the change in returns to the different levels of 
education above and below the critical level. The first five years and the relevant Gini 
coefficient for each year will be analysed: 
 
2011: 
100/101 x 100 = 99.01% 
100 - 99.01 = 0.99% decrease/increase in returns above (tertiary)/below (primary) 
the mean or critical level. 
 
2012: 
100/102 x 100 = 98.04& 
100 - 98.04 = 1.96% decrease/increase in returns above (tertiary)/below (primary) 
the mean or critical level. 
 
This process is repeated for 2013, 2014 and 2015. The relative decrease/increase in returns 
above (tertiary)/below (primary) the mean or critical levels calculated in this way are: 
2013: 2.91% 
2014: 3.85% 
2015: 4.76% 
 
The mean income from labour per household of the sample population is first calculated 
using the percentage of income from labour per decile (see Table 6) (Stats SA, 2012). This is 
the critical level. The percentage-change in the proportion of educational attainment per year 
(as seen above) will be applied to the returns to education above and below this critical level.  
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To illustrate for 2011: for all labour income above the critical level there will be a 
decrease in returns of 0.99%, while for all labour income below the critical level there will be 
an increase in returns of 0.99%. The total income for each household will then be ranked 
once again and put into deciles to calculate the Gini coefficient.  
For 2012, the new mean income will have to be calculated to identify the new critical 
level.  The process explained for 2011 will then be repeated, using the total percentage-
change in the proportion of educational attainment up until 2012 of 1.96%. Once again the 
total income for each household is ranked and then put into deciles so that the Gini 
coefficient can be calculated. This process is continued, accounting for inflation each year 
and the impact on household income per decile is shown in table 10. 
 
Table 10: Household income per decile before and after a narrowing of the skills premium  
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Original 
Aggregate 
Income 
2011 
4574 12853 18471 25588 33809 45690 65368 101530 179836 485247 
Aggregate 
Income 
After 
Narrowing 
of Skill 
Premium 
2015 
6084 16999 24664 34494 46006 63100 91174 120272 202730 547669 
Aggregate 
Income 
After 
Narrowing 
of the 
Skills 
Premium 
(Without 
Inflation) 
4819 13465 19536 27322 36441 49981 72218 95267 160581 433805 
 
 
The impact of the narrowing of the skills premium on income distribution as calculated by 
the Gini coefficient is shown in Chapter 5. 
 
  
52 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 5: STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The impact on the Gini Coefficients of the household income distributions of the three 
scenarios outlined in chapter 4 are discussed in this Chapter. The results are analysed and 
compared to what was expected from the literature. 
 
5.2 Policy outcome 1: The Social Solidarity Grant 
The results of the impact of the Solidarity Grant on the household income per decile 
(demonstrated in Table 8) on the Gini coefficient from 2011-15 are shown in Table 11 and 
Figure 8. 
Table 11: Annual Gini Coefficients as a result of the Social Solidarity Grant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Control Gini 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 
Social 
Solidarity 
Grant Gini 
0,5554 0,5554 0,5554 0,5554 0,5554 
Total 
Change 0,0683 
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Figure 7: Change in the Lorenz Curve by 2015 as a result of the introduction of the Social 
Solidarity Grant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results are not surprising and are in line with the literature regarding the effect that 
transfer payments have on inequality. Given the fact that South Africa has such high levels of 
both poverty and unemployment, with many people having no income whatsoever, a grant of 
this nature would be expected to have a very significant initial impact on the levels of 
inequality. A very large proportion of the sample population - up until the sixth decile - met 
the requirements of the means testing and so were eligible for the Social Solidarity Grant. 
This highlights the extent of the severity of both inequality and poverty in South Africa, and 
it would be expected that the effect on inequality of implementing so broad a grant such as 
this would be very significant. 
On top of this, funding such an endeavour by taxing the top decile of the sample-
population serves to reinforce and strengthen the initial impact on inequality of the Social 
Solidarity Grant. 
In line with Bhorat et al (2000), the results here show that while an increase in the 
provision of social grants by government has a very strong initial effect (decreasing the Gini 
coefficient by roughly 6.5 percentage points in the first year), it has no  further effect 
thereafter (see Table 11). Gumede (2009) also supports the finding that the effect on 
inequality of giving income to the very poor can be large, because so many of the poor have 
no income at all.  
 
  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
equality
Lorenz with
Grant
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION 
P
E
R
C
E
N
T
A
G
E
 O
F
 
IN
C
O
M
E
 
54 | P a g e  
 
5.3 Policy outcome 2: Decreasing Unemployment by 5% 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001) believe that access to wage employment, or the lack thereof, is 
the primary driver of persistently high levels of inequality in South Africa. Therefore, 
following from this train of thought, they believe that job creation must be an important part 
of any significant changes in inequality. 
Decreasing unemployment, or creating jobs, will give income to those at the bottom of the 
distribution (the people who need it the most). This additional injection of income should 
make the distribution of income more equal (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Nattrass and 
Seekings (2001) argue that this approach is ideal for South Africa, given that there is such a 
large amount of the work-force who earn no income at all, with some individuals and 
households not even receiving income from the government (Stats SA, 2012).  
The results of the creation of the impact of low-paying job creation on household income 
were shown in Table 9. The impact of these changes on the Gini Coefficient are shown in 
Tables 12 and 13 and Figure 8. 
 
Table 12: The impact of an additional 216 000 jobs per annum on the Gini Coefficient  
 
 
Table 13: Annual changes in the Gini Coefficient as a result of the creation of an additional 
216 000 jobs per annum 
 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Magnitude of 
Change in Gini 
Index 
0,0044 0,0053 0,0050 0,0048 
 
 
  
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Control Gini 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 
Gini with 
Additional 
Jobs 
0,6165 0,6112 0,6062 0,6014 0,5968 
Total 
Change 
0,02406 
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Figure 8: Change in the Lorenz Curve by 2015 as a result of the creation of jobs 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of this scenario show that a policy that decreases unemployment by 1% per 
annum from 2011 until 2015, significantly decreases inequality.  The level of inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient falls by 2.41 percentage points over the five-year period. 
The results are contrary to the beliefs of van der Berg (2012) (discussed in the next 
section), who argued that low-income job creation will impact more on poverty than 
inequality.  The outcome of the scenario highlights the extent of both inequality and poverty 
in South Africa. Upon receiving only the minimum wage (R33 600), a household which 
received no income at all (from labour or government) can find itself moving from the 
bottom decile of income distribution, all the way to the middle of the distribution - just below 
the aggregate income for the fifth decile, without taking into account any additional 
government transfers they may receive on top of their labour income (see Table 6). 
Table 12 reveals that increasing job creation year-upon-year, although not immediately 
matching up to the added provision of government transfers in terms of the magnitude of its 
effect on inequality, decreases levels of inequality at a fairly constant and consistent rate over 
time. This aspect of the effect of job creation may give it an advantage over the ‘Social 
Solidarity Grant’ as a policy option for combatting inequality. The results suggest that over 
time job creation would continue to further reduce levels of inequality.  It would also be a 
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more sustainable and manageable option that would have many other positive externalities - 
one of which might be a diminished reliance on the state for social support, allowing 
government spending to be directed elsewhere.  
What makes this approach so very effective is the fact that there are such high levels of 
unemployment and poverty in South Africa.  The results of the creation of low-income jobs 
on inequality demonstrates that a policy involving the addition of income has a significant 
effect on the income distribution, because there is so little income at the bottom of the 
distribution to start with.  As a result, any injection of income causes big movements up along 
the distribution of income.   
 
5.4 Policy outcome 3: The Narrowing of the Skills Premium 
Van der Berg (2010), Woolard et al (2009) and Gelb (2003) all argue that the most effective 
means by which high levels of inequality can be addressed is by the narrowing of the skills 
premium. The theory behind this is that through an expansion of education (tertiary education 
in this scenario) the supply of skilled labour can be increased and the supply of unskilled 
labour decreased. If this happens, then the wage paid for skilled labour will decrease, and the 
wage paid to unskilled labour will increase.  Hence, a narrowing of the skills premium, or a 
narrowing of the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour. This all happens 
through the price and quantity effects elaborated on above. If a narrowing of the skill 
premium is successful, the theory suggests that there would be a decrease in earnings 
differentials along the income distribution. In application, as illustrated by this scenario, this 
would translate into an increase in returns to education below what Finn et al (2015) call the 
critical level, and a decrease in returns to education above the critical level. The results on 
household income of the narrowing of the skills premium were shown in Table 10. The 
impact of these changes on the Gini Coefficient are shown in Tables 14 and 15 and Figure 9. 
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Table 14: The impact of a narrowing of the skills premium on the Gini Coefficient  
 
 
Table: 15 Annual changes in the Gini Coefficient as a result of a narrowing of the skills 
premium 
 
 
Figure 9: Change in the Lorenz Curve by 2015 as a result of a narrowing of the skills 
premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of a narrowing of the skills premium is shown in Table 14 and 15 and Figure 9.  
The impact is not as significant as Van der Berg (2010) suggested it might be. The results in 
Year  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Percentage 
Narrowing of 
the Skill 
Premium 
1,98 % 3,92 % 5,82 % 7,92 % 9,52 % 
Control Gini 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 0,6209 
Gini with 
Narrowed 
Skill Premium 
0,6191 0,6154 0,6099 0,6024 0,5931 
Total Change 
in Gini Index 
0,02780 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Magnitude of 
Change in 
Gini Index 
0,0018 0,0037 0,0055 0,0074 0,0094 
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Table 14 do, however, confirm his belief that through a narrowing of the skill premium, there 
can be a significant decline in inequality.  
The narrowing of the skills premium has a slightly more significant effect on inequality 
over the five-year period than the decrease in unemployment in Scenario 2. The narrowing of 
the skills premium decreased the Gini coefficient by 0.02780 against a decrease of 0.02406 
achieved by the job creation scenario (see Table 14 and Table 12). 
What works in favour of this approach to combatting inequality is the fact that as time 
passes, the effect on inequality of a narrowing of the skills premium increases (see Table 15).  
This finding makes logical sense.  An expansion of tertiary education would happen over 
time, as the proportion of individuals who have achieved tertiary education will increase year 
by year. Therefore, through the price and substitution effects the supply of skilled labour and 
the supply of unskilled labour would continue to increase and decrease respectively year by 
year at an increasing rate, while both the quantity demanded of skilled labour and unskilled 
labour increase and decrease respectively. If we assume the closed system of the Classical 
labour market, while also assuming that the availability of skilled labour is increasing by 1% 
a year (and the supply of unskilled labour to be decreasing by 1% per year) ceteris paribus, 
the rate of change in returns to education, both below and above the critical level, will be 
changing at an increased rate.  
It must be noted, however, that van der Berg’s (2010) assertion that an increase in job 
creation would not have a significant effect on inequality, is challenged by the results in 
scenario 2. Although the narrowing of the skill premium is shown to be more effective in its 
impact on inequality, scenario two demonstrates that job creation should not be overlooked 
when considering the problem of inequality. 
 
5.5 A comparison of the 3 Policy Outcomes 
The outcomes of the 3 scenarios of social security, job creation and a narrowing of the skills 
premium, as well as the impact of each on the Gini coefficient, are shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16: The income distributions per decile of the control population as well as each 
scenario, with the total change in the Gini coefficient for each scenario 
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Change 
in Gini 
Control 
(2011) 
4574 12853 18471 25588 33809 45690 65368 101530 179836 485247 0 
Social 
Solidarity 
Grant 
(2015) 
8537 17313 23268 30745 36852 48432 69290 107621 190626 498658 0,0683 
Additional 
Jobs 
(2015) 
8907 23527 35775 49856 65967 85731 115867 171329 295154 781413 0,0278 
Narrowing 
of Skills 
Premium 
(2015) 
6084 16999 24664 34494 46006 63100 91174 120272 202730 547669 0,02406 
 
The cost of implementing the Social Solidarity grant in 2011 works out as follows: 
Cost per individual per year of grant = 12 x R290 = R3 480 
 
Bottom four deciles of population = 40% of population of 51,8 million = 20 720 000  
Total number of eligible households = 20 720 000/3,75 (mean individuals/household) 
                                                            = 5 525 333 Eligible households 
 
There are on average 1,5 people who meet the means testing requirements per household, 
therefore: 
 
 Total cost of Social Solidarity Grant = 5 525 333 x 1.5 x R3 480 = R28 842 238 260  
 
Total Tax revenue for 2011 was R674 billion (SARS and National Treasury, 2011). Social 
spending in 2011 made up roughly 60% of total tax revenue, and constituted 3,4% of GDP 
(National Treasury, 2011). If the social solidarity grant were to be implemented, social 
spending, as a percentage of GDP, would rise to 4,3%. The implementation of the Social 
Solidarity grant would require an increase in tax revenue of 4,1%, this revenue would come 
from taxing the top decile by the full amount required to implement the grant- this amount is 
12,4% of total tax revenue from personal income (in 2011) (National Treasury, 2011.). 
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 While the effect of the implementation of this grant is once-off, the results suggest that 
the effect on inequality is nevertheless significant - more so than the continuous effects of 
both job creation and the narrowing of the skill premium over the five year period in 
question. Although this paper does not set out to determine how the three scenarios tested can 
be achieved, it must be stated that the implementation of such a grant would be an 
undertaking that may prove difficult due to the fact that the grant would be fully subsidised 
by the rich through tax increases at the very top of the distribution- which is not something 
that is done lightly. 
 In terms of the creation of jobs as a measure of decreasing inequality, South Africa has a 
very poor record regarding decreasing unemployment. The rate of unemployment has shown 
little improvement for the decade (see Figure 10), Government policy initiatives such as 
GEAR, ASGISA and the New Growth Path have done little to create substantial amounts of 
new jobs. The prospect of a 5% decrease in unemployment as required in scenario 2 would 
require a dramatic departure from the historical pattern of job creation in South Africa. 
 
 Figure 10: South African Unemployment 1994 - 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Business Tech, 2015) 
 
Spending on education in South Africa has historically been one of, if not the largest item in 
the budget typically sitting around 20% of the budget and 6,4% of GDP (Spaull, 2012). Even 
though so much money is spent on primary, secondary and tertiary education (with the 
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majority of the spending being directed to primary and secondary education), the quality of 
education is still low at the secondary level, where high rates of pupils drop out and are 
unable to complete their matric certification.  Those that do matriculate, for the large part do 
not qualify for university admittance (Spaull, 2012). Van der Berg et al (2011: 4) believes 
that “low quality education up until grade 11, can be regarded as the root cause for low 
attainment beyond grade 11”.  
Therefore, prospects of tertiary education expansion of the kind required in scenario 3 
seem unlikely in the current South African context. There does, however, seem to be 
mounting pressure on government to make tertiary education available to all regardless of 
their economic status - this has taken shape of the #feesmustfall campaign. It must be noted 
that the purpose of this study is not to determine how employment can be decreased, or how 
additional grants can be implemented, or how the skills premium can be narrowed. The 
purpose of this study is to determine, which of these three approaches, would show the most 
promise in having a real and significant effect on inequality.  
While the Social Solidarity grant achieved the best results in its once-off effect on 
inequality, it deals with the symptoms of inequality rather than the causes.  It does not pave 
the way for any meaningful change in the distribution of income going forward.  
If the problem, as van der Berg (2010) leads us to believe, is the differentials in labour 
income across the income distribution, then both the addition of low-paying jobs as well as 
the implementation of a Social Solidarity grant, while having an impact on levels of 
inequality, will do little to sustainably and consistently decrease inequality going forward.  
The narrowing of the skills premium confronts the problem of differentials in labour 
income directly. As tertiary education expands, the skills premium narrows at an accelerated 
rate. This approach, if successful, allows people to be responsible for their own livelihood 
decreasing their reliance on the state (simultaneously freeing state funds, which can be used 
elsewhere). On top of this, there are other positive associations that go hand in hand with a 
wider base of educated citizens, such as economic growth and innovation (as more people 
participate actively in the economy) to name a few- if one ignore its association with 
inequality, the expansion of education, and its other far reaching consequences, is still 
something to be strived for.  
Thus, while the impact on inequality of scenario 1 is greatest, the impact is once-off.  The 
impact of scenarios 2 and 3 is cumulative and will, over time, exceed that of scenario 1.  
Scenario 1 also requires hand-outs to the poor by government.  This dependency is less 
empowering and sustainable than outcomes based on job creation and improved skills.  
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Moreover, it represents simply a redistribution of existing income.  Job creation and 
improved skills would be growth enhancing.   
Finally, it should be noted that the greater effectiveness of scenario 1 is partly because it is 
funded by a tax on the richest decile.  Inequality is reduced both because the incomes of the 
poor rise and incomes of the rich fall. Table 16 shows that the 2015 incomes of virtually all 
deciles are higher in scenarios 2 and 3 than scenario 1.  Only in scenario 3 are the 2015 
incomes for deciles 1 and 2 lower than in scenario 1.  In terms of improved welfare scenarios 
2 and 3 are therefore preferable.  Only if one focuses on inequality in isolation is scenario 1 a 
preferred outcome. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY 
 
 
6.1 Summary and conclusions 
Woolard et al (2009) and Bhorat et al (2000) both argue that social grants/transfer payments 
do not actively diminish inequality. Although both Woolard et al (2009) and Bhorat et al 
(2000) disregard government transfers as a policy tool with which inequality can be 
approached, both concede that without social transfers inequality in South Africa today 
would be much worse than it is. A test done by Bhorat et al (2000) shows that without grants 
the South African Gini coefficient had a value of 0.71, while after the implementation of 
grants this value came down quite significantly to 0.61.  
While there is no doubt therefore that without grants inequality would be much worse, it is 
however pertinent to note that grants do not actively diminish inequality aside from the once-
off effect that accompanies the implementation of a grant. The real usefulness of grants 
comes in the shape of their impact on levels of poverty, which is substantial (Bhorat et al, 
2000). 
 The research undertaken in this study supports the findings of both Woolard et al (2009) 
and Bhorat et al (2000).  The resultant effect on the Gini coefficient of an increase in the 
provision of government transfers, in the form of a new ‘Social Solidarity Grant’ of R300, is 
initially very substantial. After this initial impact however, there is zero impact on inequality 
moving forward in the five year period of the scenario. Therefore, this paper corroborates the 
conclusions of both Woolard et al (2009) and Bhorat et al (2000) regarding the usefulness of 
government transfers as a policy tool used to decrease inequality.  
On top of the fact that grants provide only a once-off impact, taxing the rich to fund such 
an endeavour is unlikely to be met with enthusiasm by those in the top decile.  This could 
have a negative effect on the economy.  
Continuity and sustainability being the primary concerns with regards to decreasing 
inequality, rolling out new government transfers year upon year is neither feasible nor 
sustainable. Therefore, this paper suggests that this approach cannot be used to affect 
meaningful and sustainable changes in inequality. 
Nattrass and Seekings (2001: 54) firmly believe that “access to wage employment is a key 
determinant of inequality in South Africa”. Following from this, if more access can be given 
to the poor through the creation of jobs, there will be a positive change in income 
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distribution. Conversely, van der Berg (2010) holds that it is not the level of employment, but 
rather the differentials in the wages of those who are employed, that defines inequality.  
Labour income inequality takes the form of the skills premium, which is defined as the 
relative difference in earnings between those with primary/secondary education and those 
with tertiary education (van der Berg, 2010). Therefore, inequality of educational attainment 
is translated into inequality of labour income, which in turn defines total income inequality 
(van der Berg, 2010). Van der Berg (2010) therefore believes that the only way in which 
inequality can be significantly decreased is by expanding education, thereby increasing the 
supply of skilled labour.  Through the processes already described, this will decrease the 
skills premium and decrease inequality resultantly (van der Berg, 2010). 
The results of the third scenario presented in this study support van der Berg’s (2010) 
position with regards to the effectiveness that the narrowing of the skill premium in bringing 
about a decline in the Gini coefficient.  
However, scenario 2 contradicts van der Berg’s (2010) belief that job creation is not an 
effective means of decreasing inequality.  It supports Nattrass and Seekings’ (2001) belief 
that job creation may be an effective measure for decreasing inequality. The only 
distinguishing feature between the two approaches that favours the narrowing of the skill 
premium as an area with greater promise, is that with narrowing of the skills premium 
inequality decreases at an increasing rate. This makes this approach preferable as it promises 
the possibility of sustainable, significant and accelerating deterioration of inequality over 
time. 
Van der Berg’s (2010) belief that increasing employment at the bottom of the income 
distribution will not be effective in significantly affecting persistently high levels of 
inequality in a sustainable way seems logical. The end-goal of a more equal society should be 
to have diminished wage differentials. Creating more jobs at the bottom of the income 
distribution of an already very unequal country will have a significant effect on 
unemployment but perpetuates inequality in the labour market.  
The question therefore is why decreasing unemployment was successful in reducing 
inequality in scenario 2. Finn (2015) would argue that the reason for this is contextual. In a 
country with exceptionally high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty, it does 
make sense that job creation would have a significant impact on inequality.  This is due to the 
fact that the levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment are so extreme - with many 
people currently earning nothing from labour income. To illustrate this, in the Income and 
Expenditure Survey for South Africa 2010/11 (Stats SA, 2012), the top decile earns over 43% 
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of the sample-population’s income, while the bottom decile earns only 1%. The tiny share of 
the bottom decile is so low because so many households earn no labour income at all. 
It must be noted that Brazil has significantly lower levels of unemployment than South 
Africa (Finn, 2015). In light of this, it is unsurprising that an approach involving the 
narrowing of the skills premium shows greater returns in Brazil.  Because more people have 
jobs, there are more people to experience both the relative increases and decreases in returns 
to education as the skill premium narrows, making this approach more effective. Once again 
we are reminded of the importance of context in approaching the problem of inequality.  
Given that the sample-population used is very small, the full extent of the problems of 
inequality, poverty and unemployment cannot be fully captured in scenarios such as those 
used in this study. It is possible that the skills premium in South Africa would not be 
narrowed as easily as demonstrated in the third scenario, or as empirically observed in Brazil. 
With so many unemployed individuals at the unskilled level in South Africa (in contrast to 
Brazil’s much lower unemployment rate), a decrease in the supply of unskilled labour may 
not lead to a rise in unskilled wages as swiftly as is assumed.  Likewise, a rise in the supply 
of skilled labour where skills are in short supply may not initially reduce the skilled wage 
premium.  The narrowing of the skills premium will therefore take much longer than 
demonstrated in the third hypothetical scenario. There are, however, other reasons that there 
might be an increase in the wage paid to unskilled labour, such as rising minimum wages for 
example. 
 
6.2 Implications for policy 
Given, then, South Africa’s high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment, Nattrass 
and Seekings’ (2001) proposition that job creation should take centre-stage in the battle 
against inequality is very much worth considering. In fact, it is worth conceptualising and 
researching the plausibility of a combination of education expansion (both in terms of 
availability and quality) to effect a narrowing of the skills premium in conjunction with 
policy aimed at significantly decreasing unemployment. Seemingly, the combination of these 
two approaches would be self-reinforcing and could have extremely promising results. 
It must be stressed again that this paper set out to determine what possible approaches 
could be taken to combat persistently high levels of inequality in South Africa. The purpose 
has been to highlight possible policy actions that deserve further attention and research, and 
to determine which of these policy actions show greater promise in their ability to bring about 
66 | P a g e  
 
a decline inequality. The question of “how” these policy actions can be achieved or 
implemented is not in the scope of this study.  It merely illustrates the outcomes that such 
hypothetical policies may have. 
What has been established, is that there are no easy answers regarding efforts to decrease 
inequality. It can be concluded that implementing the provision of additional transfer 
payments will have a significant initial effect on inequality; this effect however is once-off 
and costly. This fact along with possible economic consequences from taxing the rich to the 
extent that is required, and the fact that it is not sustainable to continue increasing the 
provision of transfer payments, make this approach unfavourable. In addition, it does not 
address the core problem or root cause behind inequality and promotes a culture of reliance 
on the state.  One could refer to this approach as “kicking the can down the road”. While 
simpler to implement, it does not address the underlying causes of very high inequality in 
South Africa.  
Although both job creation and the narrowing of the skills premium were found to be 
significantly effective in decreasing inequality (with the narrowing of the skills premium 
demonstrating decreases in inequality at an increasing rate over time), due to high levels of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality in South Africa the narrowing of the skills premium 
may not initially be as effective in reality as the scenarios suggest.  
High levels of poverty and unemployment may favour a policy encouraging job creation 
as an effective approach to decreasing inequality because of its many possible positive 
externalities. A narrowing of the skills premium through education addresses the root cause 
of inequality: wage differentials in the labour market. On top of this, it allows for an 
accelerating reconstruction of the income distribution. Therefore, it is an approach to 
reducing inequality that has a lot of potential and needs more attention.  
A dual approach of both job creation as well as a narrowing of the skill premium may be 
mutually reinforcing.  If there are more people with jobs, changes in returns on skills will be 
more extensive. 
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